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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
SERGIO SALDANA, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 960168-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Jurisdiction authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of 
Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
ammended) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Was the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's 
finding of guilty? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC. 
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(2) (a) (i) . Prohibited acts B — 
Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally 
to possess or use a controlled substance, 
unless it was obtained under a valid 
prescription or order, directly from a 
practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise 
authorized by this subsection; 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-501(1). Presumption of innocence -
"Element of the offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to 
be innocent until each element of the offense charged 
against him is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In 
absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SALDANA was charged by Information dated December 1, 1994, 
alleging a violation date of December 1, 1994. SALDANA was charged 
with possession of a controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana. 
SALDANA appeared pro se before the court on December 14, 1994, 
and requested court-appointed counsel. The court granted the 
motion giving notice of appointment of counsel to Thomas H. Means. 
Evidence was heard by the court without a jury. The court entered 
a verdict of guilty to possession of marijuana. Final judgment was 
entered upon the verdict on February 26, 1996. SALDANA filed a 
Notice of Appeal on March 7, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Honorable Ray M. 
Harding Jr., Circuit Court Judge, Fourth Circuit Court, Provo City 
Department, State of Utah, rendered on February 26, 1996, upon 
verdict that SALDANA was guilty of possessing marijuana after trial 
on October 2 6, 1995. SALDANA appeals from such judgment and 
specifically of the trial court's findings that the evidence 
presented at trial was sufficient to find SALDANA guilty of 
possessing marijuana beyond a reasonable doubt. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(All references are to pages of the Trial Transcript, i.e., TT. 3) 
The facts of this case are brief and essentially undisputed by 
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the parties. A reading of the transcript of the testimony of the 
security guard found on pages 3 through 21 of the trial transcript 
as well as the testimony of the police officer found on pages 21 
through 27 of the trial transcript will give a complete overview of 
the facts. To comply with Rule 24(a)(7) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, SALDANA nevertheless sets forth the facts as 
follows: 
On December 1, 1994, Steven Johnson, a security guard at the 
Edge Dance Club in Provo Utah, was working at the dance club. At 
about midnight, he was observing the patrons in the basement dance 
floor area. He noticed the smell of marijuana and looked to find 
where the smell was coming from. He said the dance floor was 
"fairly crowded." He observed a group of five or six individuals 
passing around a cigarette. He made the observations of the group 
from less than ten (10) feet away. He subsequently grabbed two 
individuals in the group. He grabbed the two individuals who he 
thought were in possession of the cigarette (TT. 6-8) . 
Mr. Johnson said the dance floor where he thought he smelled 
marijuana was "a somewhat dark dance floor down in the basement." 
He further stated that the corner where the group was located was 
an "even darker" area than the dance floor. He testified that he 
observed two individuals smoke the cigarette. He described the 
general size and shape of the cigarette as "probably two inches or 
less" and "rather thin." He was not able to give any description 
to the manner in which the cigarette was burning. He stated that 
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he made the observations for "maybe five seconds" before he grabbed 
the two individuals (TT. 9-11). 
After Mr. Johnson grabbed the two individuals, one of the 
individuals being SALDANA, he escorted them to the back door 
upstairs from the basement. Mr. Johnson made some observations of 
SALDANA at the back door. He said that SALDANA "smelled very 
strongly of Marijuana", "his eyes were bloodshot", and "he seemed 
very nervous." He also had SALDANA breathe on him and he testified 
that SALDANA1 S "breath smelled very much so of Marijuana." He 
described SALDANA'S eyes as "kind of glazed over, bloodshot, pupils 
were dilated." Mr. Johnson concluded from his observations that 
SALDANA was under the influence of marijuana (TT. 12-14) . 
In response to the question from the prosecutor, "Where was 
the cigarette that you've referred to?", Mr. Johnson responded, "It 
was not on his person when I brought him to the back door." He 
testified that he and other security guards attempted to locate the 
cigarette but were unsuccessful (TT. 13-14). 
On cross-examination, Mr. Johnson clarified his earlier 
statement that he observed two individuals smoke the cigarette. He 
stated that he only observed one individual smoke the cigarette. 
However, he thought that of the two individuals he grabbed one had 
just smoked the cigarette and passed it and the other had just 
received it. Mr. Johnson also testified that he found no marijuana 
or paraphernalia on SALDANA (TT. 19-20). 
Mr. Johnson testified that he was familiar with marijuana. He 
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gained his familiarity with marijuana through "experiences as an 
adolescent" and through his work in Salt Lake City. He testified 
that he works at a Forensic Toxicology Lab. However, at the time 
of the incident with SALDANA, Mr. Johnson had just began working at 
the Toxicology Lab. He testified that his ability to detect 
marijuana on the street comes strictly from his life experiences 
growing up and that his work does not help him detect marijuana on 
the street. He also testified that he was not trained to detect 
marijuana on the street. He described the smell of marijuana as 
being very distinct and different from typical cigarette smoke or 
from clove cigarette smoke. He testified that he has taken some 
classes at the University of Utah, prior to the incident with 
SALDANA, that had helped him to know the manner in which marijuana 
is used and abused (TT. 5, 17-18). 
Officer Broberg, who was one of the police officers that 
responded to a call from the Edge Dance Club security guards, made 
some observations of SALDANA. He testified that SALDANA1 S clothes 
had "a very strong odor of Marijuana" and concluded from the 
strength of the smell that SALDANA had been around burnt marijuana 
recently. He also had SALDANA breathe on him and he observed that 
SALDANA1S breath had "a very strong odor of Marijuana." He also 
observed that SALDANA eyes were bloodshot and that SALDANA appeared 
nervous. However, Officer Broberg testified that SALDANA1S 
nervousness could have been caused by being in the presence of 
several security guards. Officer Broberg testified that he felt 
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that SALDANA was in possession of marijuana based on the statements 
of Mr. Johnson and from his own observations of SALDANA (TT. 22-
27) . 
Officer Broberg testified that he was familiar with the smell 
of marijuana and that he could differentiate the smell from other 
smells. He gained his familiarity with marijuana through officer 
training and encountering marijuana weekly on his job (TT. 24). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to establish 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt that SALDANA was in possession of 
an illegal substance. 
ARGUMENT 
THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED AT TRIAL WAS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
GUILT BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT SALDANA WAS IN POSSESSION OF 
AN ILLEGAL SUBSTANCE 
The Standard of Review. 
SALDANA challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support 
of the ultimate verdict. "In reviewing the sufficiency of the 
evidence at a bench trial, as occurred here, [the appellate court] 
will not set aside the verdict unless clearly erroneous, and where 
the result is against the clear weight of the evidence, or [the 
appellate court] otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction 
that a mistake has been made. State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Ut. 
1987); State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 184 (Ut. App. 1990); State v. 
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Ut. 1991); State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328 
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(Ut. App. 1990); State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98 (Ut. App. 1990); and 
State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Ut. App. 1987). 
Marshalling. 
When challenging the findings of fact of the trial court on 
appeal, the appellant must show that the findings of fact were 
clearly erroneous. In order to show clear error, the appellant 
must marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial court's 
findings of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
support the findings against an attack. State v. Moosman, supra; 
State v. Moore, 801 P.2d 732 (Ut. App. 1990). 
"Due process requires the prosecution to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
charged." State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Ut. App. 1988). "We 
will not make 'speculative leaps across . . . remaining gaps' in 
I 
the evidence. Every element of the crime charged must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. If the evidence does not support those 
! 
elements, the verdict must fail." State v. Harmon, 767 P.2d 567 
(Ut. App. 1989) and State v. Strieby, supra. "Utah Code Annotated, 
§7 6-1-501 requires that each element of a criminal offense be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 
(Ut. 1991) and State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150 (Ut. App. 1991) . In 
this matter, SALDANA is specifically charged with possessing a 
controlled substance, to wit: Marijuana. "Where possession of 
narcotics is the jest of the offense charged, the government must 
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establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance involved is 
that specified in the indictment-" State v. Schofill, 621 P.2d 364 
(HI 1980) . Therefore, if SALDANA'S conviction is to stand, the 
City must have introduced some believable evidence on the identity 
of the substance allegedly possessed and must have proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt the identity of marijuana in SALDANA'S possession 
in order to sustain the ultimate finding of guilt. 
The evidence that was available to the trial court on the 
issue of the identification of the substance allegedly possessed by 
SALDANA is as follows: SALDANA was supposedly observed either 
passing or receiving a cigarette at a dance club (TT. page 19 
lines 3-20). The security guard, Steven Johnson, testified that he 
observed the smell of marijuana and that he observed a group of 
five or six individuals passing around a cigarette (TT. page 7 
lines 7-20). He testified that he was less than ten feet away from 
the group when he noticed them (TT. page 7 line 16) . He described 
the general size and shape of the cigarette as "probably two inches 
or less" and "rather thin" (TT. page 11 lines 3-4) . He testified 
that as he approached the individuals the smell of marijuana became 
stronger (TT. page 8). Mr. Johnson made his observations of the 
group and the cigarette for "maybe five seconds" before he grabbed 
two individuals (TT. page 11 lines 14-17) . Mr. Johnson testified 
that the dance floor was in the basement and was "a somewhat dark 
dance floor down in the basement" and the corner where the group 
was located was "even darker" (TT. page 9-10 lines 25; 1-2). On 
8 
direct examination, Mr. Johnson testified that he had observed two 
individuals smoke the cigarette (TT. page 10 line 17). On cross-
examination, Mr. Johnson•changed his testimony of observing two 
individuals smoke the cigarette to just seeing one individual smoke 
the cigarette (TT. page 20 line 1-2). He was not able to give any 
testimony as to the manner in which the cigarette burned (TT. page 
11 lines 7-8) . 
Mr. Johnson grabbed two individuals, one of which was SALDANA, 
and took them to the back door where it was better lit (TT. pages 
9-11). Mr. Johnson testified that SALDANA "smelled very strongly 
of Marijuana", "his eyes were bloodshot", and "he seemed very 
nervous" (TT. page 12 lines 9-12). He testified that the smell of 
marijuana was coming from SALDANA1 S clothing and that he had 
SALDANA breathe on him and that SALDANA1 S "breath smelled very much 
so of Marijuana" (TT. page 12 lines 15-17). He testified that the 
condition of SALDANA1S eyes were "kind of glazed over, bloodshot, 
pupils were dilated" (TT. page 14 lines 18-19). He testified that 
from his observations of SALDANA he concluded that SALDANA was 
under the influence of marijuana (TT. page 14 lines 22-25). Mr. 
Johnson, along with other security guards, attempted to locate the 
cigarette but were unsuccessful (TT. pages 13-14) . He did not 
find any marijuana or paraphernalia in the possession of SALDANA 
(TT. pages 20-21). 
Mr. Johnson testified that he was familiar with marijuana. He 
gained his familiarity with marijuana through "experiences as an 
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adolescent" and through his work in Salt Lake City. He testified 
that he works at a Forensic Toxicology Lab. However, at the time 
of the incident with SALDANA, Mr. Johnson had just began working at 
the Toxicology Lab (TT. page 5). He testified that his ability to 
detect marijuana on the street comes from his life experiences 
growing up and that his work does not help him detect marijuana on 
the street. He also testified that he was not trained to detect 
marijuana on the street (TT. page 17) . He described the smell of 
marijuana as being very distinct and different from typical 
cigarette smoke or from clove cigarette smoke (TT. page 5 lines 
23-25) . He testified that he has taken some classes at the 
University of Utah, prior to the incident with SALDANA, that had 
helped him to know the manner in which marijuana is used and abused 
(TT. pages 17-18). 
Mr. Johnson testified that the police were called and that it 
took the police about five minutes to get to the dance club (TT. 
page 13). Officer Broberg testified that he made some observations 
of SALDANA. He testified that SALDANA'S clothes had "a very strong 
odor of Marijuana" (TT. page 24 line 1) . And concluded that 
because of the strength of the odor, SALDANA had been around burnt 
marijuana recently (TT. page 24 lines 17-18). He also had SALDANA 
breathe on him and he observed that SALDANA'S breath had "a very 
strong odor of Marijuana" (TT. page 24 lines 22-24) . He also 
observed that SALDANA had bloodshot eyes and appeared nervous (TT. 
page 25 lines 3-6) . Officer Broberg testified he felt SALDANA was 
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11 
If the controlled substance can be seen and measured, we 
conclude that the amount is sufficient to establish the 
defendant knew it was a controlled substance. Thomas v. 
State, 807 SW.2d 786 (Tx. Ct. App. 1991). 
A review of the law from other jurisdictions reveals a 
majority of jurisdictions hold possession of the residue 
of a contraband drug, so long as the residue is capable 
of being identified, is sufficient to support a 
conviction for possession. State v. Robinson, 411 SE.2d 
678 (S. Ca. Ct. App. 1991). 
In State v. Miller, supra, this Court sustained the 
identification of a controlled substance (marijuana) that had been 
seized pursuant to a search warrant. The trial court had found the 
substance properly identified on the strength of objective 
observations of a professional narcotics agent and scientific 
tests. It is not clear whether the marijuana was introduced at 
trial. In State v. Hull, 487 P.2d 1314 (Mont. 1971), the seized 
controlled substance was analyzed but not introduced at trial. 
Instead, the results of the analysis were introduced by the 
chemist. That court ruled, ff[w]e are aware of no requirement that 
the alleged dangerous drug must be introduced at the trial." In 
Corry v. State, 543 P.2d 565 (Okl. Ct. App. 1975), the 
identification of marijuana was upheld on the testimony of the 
sheriff who seized the substance and identified it based on his 
police training on the subject and experience with the substance in 
the course of police investigations. No chemical analysis was 
performed in this case. 
Utah has little case law on the requirements for 
identification of a controlled substance. However, the foregoing 
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Utah upholds criminal convictions based un purely 
circumstanto.^^ evidence, Provo City Corp, v. SpottS/ 861 P,2d 437 
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guilt beyond a reasonable auuu " - ..;J UU cases where neither the 
substance nor expert chemical analysis provided.' " Id. at 442; 
See also, United States v. Raggett, 8C- °* inQC\f 1 096-97 (1 0th 
Cir. 1989); United States v. Dolan, 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 
1976); United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1263 (4th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 419 U.S. 1024 (1974). In Dolan, the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals set out six (6) factors that may be included in 
sufficient circumstantial proof of the identity of a controlled 
substance: (a) evidence of the physical appearance of the substance 
involved, (b) evidence that the substance produced the expected 
effects when sampled by someone familiar with the elicit drug, (c) 
evidence that the substance was used in the same manner as the 
elicit drug, (d) testimony that a high price was paid in cash for 
the substance, (e) evidence that transactions involving the 
substance were carried out in secrecy or deviousness, and (f) 
evidence that the substance was called by the name of the illegal 
narcotic by the defendant or others in his presence. Id. at 1221; 
See also, United States v. Scott, 725 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1984). 
In Spotts, this Court adopted the six-factor test of Dolan. 
Id. at 442. This Court found the six-factor test was not intended 
to be an exhaustive list. Id. at 442. This Court also found that 
circumstantial evidence did not require the proof of all six 
factors to be substantial enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Id. at 442. However, this court recognized the limitations 
of circumstantial evidence. This court stated in Spotts: 
We note, however, that this case approaches the outer 
limit of what we would affirm for a possession case where 
the substance itself or chemical test data was not 
produced. We emphasize that this case involved not only 
the substancefs smell, but also simultaneous observation 
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of the smoke exiting oeienuaiitf s inoiitl 1 ai i< 1 pi ioi: 
observation of the act of taking "hits" from a "joint." 
Also, defendant made several inculpatory statements and 
Officer Weinmuller was able to observe the defendant's 
physical characteristics, aspects of which were 
consistent with those of a person affected by marijuana. 
Id. at 443. 
This Court found that slicrht variants of four of the six factor? 
Do Ian were met •»" Spotts and one of the six factors was cl-_-- v 
met. IcL a* 44 Spot • til  defendarr -as observed takinq 
"h. i 1 .: M- ullh 
observed and smelled smoke exit the defendant's mouth, The police 
of fir- l - - ^ceived *--- * - - ^nd
 w a b i ami liar with illegal 
a u g s etna • ,.- ucic i m e u a : ui ugs on the street. In addition 
i -,,. ^ Hspr^3+"inTiq m^ u- bv *~h& r^r\) i no ^ff i rpv +-?.(-> H^fendant made 
circumstantial evidence w - sufficient unde: the Do Ian test 
upholding convictions * nat nave less circumstantial e\idence. Id. 
at 442. 
In State v. Hutton, 502 P.2d 103^ fWa ^ *~~ ia^o\ +-V,O 
Washington Court of Appeals recoanizpd "amr ^ v^i-n *-jrv * **. 
m o p D M I 11 mi II III Il 
distribution case, can be established by circumstantial evideno r 
Thi4-
praaein e JJUL necebsit. nb we-i wuuia dictate - riat some oxpre>sion 
wi opinion through expertise, acquired through education ox 
experience, be expressed to support the identity of the substance 
15 
possessed or distributed-" That court reversed a conviction for 
distribution of amphetamine that had been based on the testimony of 
a lay person who had testified that the defendant gave her a white 
flaky substance, which gave her a "tingling" feeling, and that she 
had "heard" the substance was speed. She also testified that on a 
later occasion, she had asked the defendant "for some speed" and he 
gave her a substance that made her feel "a little high." No 
substance nor analysis was introduced at trial. The Washington 
Court of Appeals found the lay person's opinion insufficient to 
establish the identity of the substance. 
Other federal circuit courts of appeals have ruled that the 
identification of a controlled substance can be established by 
circumstantial evidence: 
Illegal drugs will often be unavailable for scientific 
analysis because their nature is to be consumed . . . . 
To our knowledge, no court has held that scientific 
identification of a substance is an absolute prerequisite 
to conviction for a drug-related offense, and we too are 
unwilling to announce such a rule. In view of the 
limitations that such a burden would place on 
prosecutors, and in accordance with general evidentiary 
principles, courts have held that the government may 
establish the identity of a drug through cumulative 
circumstantial evidence. United States v. Schrock, 855 
F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1988). See also, United States v. 
Osgood, 794 F.2d 1087 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Meeks, 857 F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. 
Eakes, 783 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1986); and United States v. 
Brown, 887 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1989). 
While these holdings do not specifically set out the same six (6) 
factors as Dolan, those same factors are nevertheless present in 
the facts of each of these cases. 
16 
point t.est for triK establishment : tn^ identity cf a controlled 
De Fundora, 89o L . <-.; . J -. L» ^  ^ :? ^  . . * co;:r* stated: 
The government need not introduce scientific evidence to 
prove the identity of a substance. As long as there is 
sufficient lay testimony or circumstantial evidence from, 
which a jury could find that a substance was identified 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the lack: : f scient i f ic 
evidence does not warrant reversal. Sanchez De Fundora, 
- t 1 1 7 S 
The court went •"-- +" "xamine and explain hov. 'he fix point p_olat 
test had been cor^] : ^  * .LL. XH cdui ui. De i'ondura' s eight (8) 
separate counts ot ja.diLJtion of cocaine. 
However, United States v. rug:* ** ^upra, ' ^ w^ *-iar t-hp : nth 
r-.-j linl* r:ie - f 
; ; i r cumstan t . i c j . e v i d e n c - t o e s t a b l i s h *. d e n ' i t y of a c o n t r o l l e d 
s u b s t a n c e • ±:~ jbagge1. . t 
Do I a n t e s t w i t h a u t h c ; i y JJUL i e v e i s e u adggt ; . : - vT : .:: f o r 
possession of a controlled substance. It did so stating: 
It is not necessary that the Government have direct 
• evidence to support a conviction for possession. But 
where, as in this case, the Government fails to seize and 
analyze the chemical composition of the alleged narcotic 
substance, there must be enough circumstantial evidence 
to support an inference that the defendant actually did 
possess the drugs :i n question. Baggett, at 1096 
I f the prosecution is i lot goii lg tic pr esent dir ect 
evidence of the drug possession, its circumstantial 
evidence must include some testimony linking defendant to 
a n
 observed substance that a jury can infer to be a 
narcotic. Baggett, at 1097. (Emphasis added.) 
Baggettfs telephone conversations with a suspected drug.dealer 
X / 
had been intercepted and she had been heard to arrange for the 
purchase of cocaine and heroin. Later, Baggett was observed 
meeting with the drug dealer at the pre-arranged location. 
However, no government witness testified to having seen a substance 
that appeared to be a controlled substance, or that the substance 
produced effects similar to a known controlled substance, or that 
the substance was used in the same manner as an illicit drug, or 
that any money was exchanged. The government's case consisted 
primarily of the secrecy of Baggett's actions in meeting with a 
suspected drug dealer coupled with her having referred to cocaine 
and heroin in the intercepted telephone calls in which she arranged 
for the meeting. The 10th Circuit found the totality of the 
circumstantial evidence insufficient to support a conviction, 
stating: 
Courts typically require much stronger evidence before 
holding it sufficient to meet the Government's burden of 
proof. See, e.g., Scott, 725 F.2d at 46 (finding that 
ff[e]very fact listed in Do Ian for establishing 
circumstantially the illegal character of the [substance] 
possessed by the defendant was present). Baggett, at 
1097. 
Just as with the state cases cited above, there is a common 
thread running through these federal cases in which convictions 
were upheld. Although no drugs were seized or introduced at trial, 
in each successful conviction, there was "an observed substance" 
that was competently identified beyond a reasonable doubt by the 
testimony of a witness who observed it and by application of the 
six-point DoIan test or a similarly strict standard. 
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u\j±ai. . - : . -•«•;- . " o p u ^  L. S 
were applied :., : ais case, SALDANA'S convictio: would fail. As in 
Baggett, there wd • ^  I , I »• ,1 i I ird 
that the physice*. c.opeaiaiiuc ^: ai. oost. ^ a suosiance was 
consistent with tnp , hysira• .^ : ^ ara^-p <** - controlled 
_^_ified to 
sampling the observed substance and con c l u d m c tha: produced 
effort" -t 
a nigh price was jjaiu - . cash iu: me substance; OIL; " .e substance 
was not n^r* ^ -e^recy. 
i , .... .. * nroved onl^ L:IC*L ^*^bAi--. was in the company 
of a group which were - a s s m a around a riaare +rp that- appeared to 
1 _y 
guarc did officer Broieig associated w;*r burning marijuana, and 
that his eyes wev ' 'or :r-f. * - s 
c :ijred *~^  estajjj-xsn .- yiiyz>±^c< arance o. u i 
substance, ni>- 4 ^ t - 1-• - substance produced an effect similar to 
t -.*.-; ^ t"w . : - -ana, nor that the substance was exchanged 
for <n. inordinately h: ir price, nrr that" *-ru • ubstance was used 
ser --* - ed tl le substai ice 
by ,Ai^ nditie -.J. ni iegai naLrcotic. 
The facts of this case do not re " • • : 
circumstantial evidence that were present .i;. bpotts. . ue lacts in 
SALDANA'S case rar h^ .-i st ina" ished from the facts m Spotts. 
SVL - , . . .^atory statements as did Spotts. 
Spotts made statements that referred to illegal drugs, however, no 
evidence was given against SALDANA that either he or his companion 
made any reference to illegal drugs. SALDANA was not observed by 
a person who has received training on how to detect drugs on the 
street as was Spotts. SALDANA1S supposed possession of an illegal 
drug was observed by a security guard who had gained experience on 
how to detect drugs on the street from experiences growing up. The 
police officer in Spotts actually observed smoke exit Spotts mouth 
and smelled the smoke, however, the security guard that observed 
SALDANA is not even sure whether SALDANA was passing or receiving 
the observed cigarette. The police officer in Spotts was able to 
give testimony to the manner in which the "joint" was burning, 
however, the security guard in SALDANA'S case was not able to give 
any testimony as to the manner in which the cigarette was burning. 
Spotts was observed in broad daylight in an empty parking lot. 
However, SALDANA was observed on a "dark floor", in an "even darker 
corner" with the dance floor being "fairly crowded" with people. 
The police officer in Spotts was able to take time to evaluate the 
situation and make a conclusion. However, in SALDANA1 S case the 
security guard had to make a quick decision and act on it. The 
security guard made his observations from about ten (10) feet away 
and had five seconds to make his observations before grabbing two 
individuals. Similar to Spotts, SALDANA did not have any 
paraphernalia that would connect him to the crime of possession. 
The State needs more evidence to convict SALDANA of possession 
20 
I I I O l " , I ipi( 'IM] 11 CI, M i l 1 'i ill" 
giy/e otate prosecutors power to convict: on insubstantial 
circumstantia] ^--dence. People who attend activities that are 
usual "1 v h'_-.. .. *r> areas ^ I n the dark of the night, such as 
dances or concerts, w: . be susceptible re be •-onvicted of a crime 
in I i in I N < i rir| ,i r D i J i n I HI I n 
LiidL illegal drugs are present at dances or concerts but this does 
not make perole who are ' " ~ r 
qullty of possession ^ . ,^i i^i^ u.xu ;*. .iphoia convictions 
based on the theory of "where ^her^ i? smoke, there is fire." 
G.-.-„~~ 
This Court shoul 'md the evidence insr^ici^r to support 
..! J! 1!,) ^ r,' ». I JJ „ i _ ve rs ing the 
conviction. "Double jeopardy bars the retria r a defendant when 
an appellate court % - r o 
sustain a conviction," Burks v. United State.-. -^  .. *. - ; 
Greene v. Massey, 437 L.J. ±^
 v1378) ; State - i^, //^  P. ' ~8 
ana otate v. Sorenson, supra. 
DATED t h i s o clay of J u l , , „ ^ - . 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Defendant-AppelJ an: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two (2) 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant to Gary 
Gregorson and Vernon F. Romney, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee, 
at P.O. Box 1849, Provo, UT 84603, this ^  "fiT day of July, 1996. 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
Utah Code Annotated, §76-1-501(1) 
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58-37-8 OCCUPATIONS AJro PROFESSIONS 2Q8j 
(iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation 
the license; 
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the 
individual; 
(v) issue a cease and desist order; and 
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the 
required information is not submitted. 
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (aXvi) 
shall be deposited in the General Fund. 
(c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of 
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1-
108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the divi-
sion. 
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the 
database in accordance with this section may not be held 
civilly liable for having submitted the information. 
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to 
establish and operate the database shall be funded by 
appropriations from the General Fund. 
(b) Funding for this section shall be appropriated with-
out the use of any resources within the Commerce Service 
Fund. 
(15) All costs associated with recording and submitting 
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the 
submitting drug outlet. 1995 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful 
for any person to knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess 
witd intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, 
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a 
controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of 
his business as a sales representative of a manufac-
turer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules 
II through V except that he may possess such con-
trolled substances when they are prescribed to him by 
a licensed practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance 
with intent to distribute, 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa) 
with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is 
guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or 
subsequent conviction of Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of 
a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or 
maryuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon 
a second or subsequent conviction punishable under 
this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of 
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subse-
quent conviction punishable under this subsection is 
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was 
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly 
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his 
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by 
this subsection; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in 
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, 
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to 
permit them to be occupied by persons unlawful] 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sSJ 
stances in any of those locations; 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally u 
be present where controlled substances are beh?, 
used or possessed in violation of this chapter and fkf 
use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not 
concealed from those present; however, a person mat 
not be convicted under this subsection if the evidence 
shows that he did not use the substance himself or 
advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; any 
incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled sub. 
stances by the defendant may be admitted to rebut 
this defense; 
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to 
possess an altered or forged prescription or written 
order for a controlled substance; 
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter 
knowingly and intentionally to prescribe, adininiateL 
or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenik 
without first obtaining the consent required in Sec-; 
tion 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing 
in loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an 
emergency; for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile 
means a "child" as defined in Section 78-3a-2, and 
"emergency" means any physical condition requiring 
the administration of a controlled substance for im-
mediate relief of pain or suffering; 
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter 
knowingly and intentionally to prescribe or adminis-
ter dosages of a control)ed substance in excess ci 
medically recognized quantities necessary to treat 
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user, 
or 
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or 
dispense any controlled substance to another person 
knowing that the other person is using a false name, 
address, or other personal information for the pur-
pose of securing the same. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, 
is guilty of a second degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or 
maryuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but 
less than 100 pounds, is guilty of a third degree 
felony; or 
(iii) maryuana, if the maryuana is not in the form 
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and 
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection 
(2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property 
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section 
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement 
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than 
provided in Subsection (2Xb). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of posses-
sion of any controlled substance by a person previously 
convicted under Subsection (2Kb), that person shall be 
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided 
in this subsection. 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(aXi) with 
respect to all other controlled substances not included in 
Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), including less than one 
ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled 
substance as provided in this subsection, the person is 
177 CRIMINAL CODE 76-1-504 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, 
r an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine 
that there is insufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence to 
pport a conviction for an included offense and the trier of 
fact necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that 
ncluded offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be 
set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such 
relief is sought by the defendant. 1974 
76-1-4^3. Former prosecution barring subsequent 
prosecution for offense out of same episode. 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent 
prosecution for the same or a different offense arising out of 
the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that 
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-
402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment 
for the defendant that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a 
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established to secure conviction in the subsequent 
prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a 
finding of not guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination 
that there was insufficient evidence to warrant conviction. A 
finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of 
the greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser 
included offense is subsequently reversed, set aside, or va-
cated. 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a 
judgment of guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or 
vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been reversed, set 
aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; 
or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the 
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not 
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has 
been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury 
trial is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, 
termination of prosecution is not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the 
termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the 
termination is necessary because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the 
trial in conformity with the law; or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not 
attributable to the state that would make any judg-
ment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of 
law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom 
not attributable to the state makes it impossible to 
proceed with the trial without injustice to the defen-
dant or the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent 
a fair trial. 1974 
76-1-404. Concurrent jurisdiction — Prosecution in 
other jurisdiction barring prosecution in 
state. 
ft a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one 
or more offenses within the concurrent jurisdiction of this 
state and of another jurisdiction, federal or state, the prosecu-
tion in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecu-
tion in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an 
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those 
terms are defined in Section 76-1-403, and (2) the subsequent 
prosecution is for the same offense or offenses. 1973 
76-1-405. Subsequent prosecution not barred — Cir-
cumstances. 
A subsequent prosecution for an offense shall not be barred 
under the following circumstances: 
(1) The former prosecution was procured by the defen-
dant without the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney 
bringing the subsequent prosecution and with intent to 
avoid the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or 
(2) The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of 
guilt held invalid in a subsequent proceeding on writ of 
habeas corpus, coram nobis, or similar collateral attack. 
1973 
PART 5 
BURDEN OF PROOF 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the 
offense" defined. 
(1) A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be 
innocent until each element of the offense charged against him 
is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In absence of such proof, 
the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" 
mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of 
conduct proscribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the defini-
tion of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements 
of the offense but shall be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. 1973 
76-1-502. Negating defense by allegation or proof — 
When not required. 
Section 76-1-501 does not require negating a defense: 
(1) By allegation in an information, indictment, or 
other charge; or 
(2) By proof, unless: 
(a) The defense is in issue in the case as a result of 
evidence presented at trial, either by the prosecution 
or the defense; or 
(b) The defense is an affirmative defense, and the 
defendant has presented evidence of such affirmative 
defense. 1973 
76-1-503. Presumption of fact. 
An evidentiary presumption established by this code or 
other penal statute has the following consequences: 
(1) When evidence of facts which support the presump-
tion exist, the issue of the existence of the presumed fact 
must be submitted to the jury unless the court is satisfied 
that the evidence as a whole clearly negates the presumed 
fact; 
(2) In submitting the issue of the existence of a pre-
sumed fact to the jury, the court shall charge that while 
the presumed fact must on all evidence be proved beyond 
a reasonable doubt, the law regards the facts giving rise to 
the presumption as evidence of the presumed fact. 1973 
76-1-504. Affirmative defense presented by defendant. 
Evidence of an affirmative defense as defined by this code or 
other statutes shall be presented by the defendant. 1973 
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